WILDFIRE CRIME AND SOCIAL VULNERABILITY IN ITALY: A PANEL INVESTIGATION by CANEPA, Alessandra & DROGO, FEDERICO
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
05/20 
 
Working Paper Series 
 
 
WILDFIRE CRIME AND SOCIAL 
VULNERABILITY IN ITALY:  
A PANEL INVESTIGATION 
 
  
ALESSANDRA CANEPA   and  FEDERICO DROGO   
 
D
ep
ar
tm
en
t o
f E
co
no
m
ic
s 
an
d 
St
at
is
ti
cs
 “
C
og
ne
tt
i d
e 
M
ar
ti
is
” 
Ca
m
pu
s L
ui
gi
 E
in
au
di
, L
un
go
 D
or
a 
Si
en
a 
10
0/
A,
 10
15
3 
To
rin
o 
(I
ta
ly
) 
w
w
w
.e
st
.u
ni
to
.it
 
 
 
The Department of Economics and Statistics “Cognetti de Martiis” publishes research papers 
authored by members and guests of the Department and of its research centers. ISSN: 2039-4004 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
Wildfire Crime and Social Vulnerability in Italy: 
A Panel Investigation 
 
 
Alessandra Canepa* and Federico Drogo† 
 
 
                                                                    January 2020 
 
 
Abstract 
 
In this paper, we analyse the socio-economic determinants of wildfire crime in Italy using panel data at regional level. 
Using fixed effect Poisson models and fixed effect quantile panel regression analysis it is found that social vulnerability 
factors such as poverty, organised crime and income inequality play an important role in driving wildfire crime. The 
quantile regression analysis highlights a significant heterogeneity of the effects of driving factors across the Italian 
peninsula. Finally, we also extend our analysis to investigate the effect of economic downturns on wildfire crime and we 
find a positive correlation between a deterioration of per capita income and wildfire crime. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Wildfires constitute a significant threat to the environmental ecosystems as the occurrence of fire can change the 
physical and structural characteristics of the landscape, thus producing significant variations of forests vegetation, soil and 
fauna. Affected forestlands suffer from the loss of vegetation cover for long periods. During this time, the soil is exposed 
to erosion by atmospheric agents that can contribute to the degradation of the nutrient cycling which are essential for 
vegetation and therefore for wildlife as a byproduct (see Di Fonzo et al., 2015). There are several causes of forestlands 
fires, however, human fire ignition is worldwide recognized to be the single most important cause of forests fire (see for 
example Ganteaume, 2013). This is particularly the case in European Mediterranean countries where it is estimated that 
more than 90% of forestland fire is caused by human action (see for example Leone et al., 2002; Velez, 2009).  
Against this background, the objective of this study is to identify significant socio-economic factors related to wildfire 
crime in Italy. The country constitutes an ideal setting to explore quantitatively the relationship between socio vulnerability 
factors and this specific type of environmental crime, for several reasons. First, the area of forestland is substantial in Italy 
as more than 35% of total area was reported as natural forestland in 2019, according to the World Bank collection of 
development indicators. Second, like as in many other Mediterranean countries in Europe, wildfires have been recognized 
as one of the most significant environmental threats giving rise to a multitude of environmental, social and economic 
impacts. However, wildfires are in most cases not originating from natural causes such as lightning, spontaneous ignition, 
volcanic eruptions, but are rather an anthropogenic phenomenon (see for example Lovreglio et al., 2010). Third, unlike 
other countries in the European Union, from the economic point of view Italy is a country profoundly divided.  As it appears 
from Figure 1A in Appendix, gross domestic per inhabitant in some regions of Northern Italy is among the highest in the 
European Union, whereas most of the Southern regions have the lowest GDP in the European Union. The historical North-
South economic divide sharply increased during the recent sovereign debt crises where a worsening of all the main socio-
economic indicators of the Southern regions was observed (see for example Musolino, 2018).       
In the crime literature, the relationship between social vulnerability factors and the incidence of crime has for long been 
an important subject of study. Theoretical models on the determinants of crime point to rational-choice factors that 
influence the likelihood of environmental crime. For example, in literature pioneered by Becker (1968) criminal's choice 
is modelled as a standard microeconomic problem of expected utility where an individual chooses whether to commit a 
crime by comparing its expected benefits with its costs, which can also include an opportunity cost, usually represented by 
income from a legal activity. Ehrlich (1973) expanded the basic analytical setting of the Becker’s model by introducing the 
interaction between potential offenders (crime supply), deterrence and prevention (government intervention). In Ehrlich 
(1973) theoretical framework any factor that modifies agents’ opportunity cost of legal activities can be included in the 
analysis of the determinants of crime. The results of empirical research support the prediction of theoretical models that 
socio-economic factors play a major role in establishing incentives for engaging in crime (see for example Enamorado et 
al., 2016; Coccia, 2017; Fajnzylber et al., 2002; Gould et al., 2002). 
Accordingly, in this paper, we are interested in addressing the following questions. First, if human induced wildfire is 
such an important cause of fire ignition, are the types of socio-economic factors that have been found relevant in the crime 
literature also pertinent for the type of environmental crime considered in this work? In other words, are factors such as 
poverty, income inequality and unemployment important drivers of wildfire crime? Also, as Italy is a country historically 
plagued by organized crime, does organised crime play a role? Or is this type of environmental crime more the result of 
individual perpetrators? In principle according to theoretical crime models (see for example Fajnzylber et al., 2002; Ehrlich, 
3 
 
1973), we should see a stronger relationship between socio-economic determinants and wildfire crime in Southern Italian 
regions with respect to the relatively wealthier Northern regions. Therefore, the second related question we address in this 
work is the following: Do socio vulnerability factors play a greater role in driving wildfire crime in more deprived regions? 
In other words, does the North-South economic divide pave the way for wildfire crime? Finally, consensus crime literature 
agrees that crime rate has a countercyclical behaviour, trending upward during recessions and downward during economic 
expansions (see for example Bushway et al., 2019; Mehlum et al., 2006). The supporting arguments for this inverted 
relationship point at several, sometime contrasting, reasons. First, the quality and quantity of legitimate employment 
opportunities are procyclical. Higher unemployment rate associated with economic recessions may promote crime by 
lowering the opportunity cost of time spent in criminal activity (see Grogger, 1998; Gould et al., 2002; Machin and Meghir, 
2004). Second, the literature has found empirical support that the use of criminogenic commodities such as alcohol or drug 
abuse are related to the business cycle (see for example Johansson et al., 2006, Cook and Moore, 1993; Cook and Durrance, 
2013). Third, expenditures in criminal deterrents are also related to business cycles. Accordingly, our third research 
question is the following: Is wildfire crime also related to the economic cycle? In other words, does the countercyclical 
relationship found in the crime literature also hold for the type of environmental crime considered in this paper?    
In order to answer the above questions, we conducted a three-step investigation. In the first step of the empirical analysis 
we shed light on the socio-economic drivers of wildfire crime in Italy by using panel data models.  Traditionally, in the 
empirical literature, modellers have tried to identify which environmental and socio-economic factors influence fire 
occurrence by using linear or nonlinear models in the context of cross-sectional data. For example, Martinez et al. (2009) 
uses the logistic regression model to investigate the causes of human factors associated with high forest fire risk in Spain. 
Similarly, logistic models and Poisson logistic regression for predicting the number of human-caused fire occurrence have 
often been used in the literature (see for example Levi and Bestelmeyer, 2016; Marchal et al., 2017). However, the use of 
pooled linear or nonlinear specifications may leave the estimated model exposed to the unobserved heterogeneity problem 
leading to biased and inconsistent estimators (see Cameron and Trivedi, 2013). Unlike most of the related literature in this 
paper we estimate a Poisson fixed effect model that allows controlling for unobserved heterogeneity. Moreover, the adopted 
model has the advantage of being robust to heteroskedasticity. In particular, by using Poisson panel-data estimation 
techniques we are able to account for time-invariant region-specific factors that are often omitted in related empirical 
works. Time-invariant heterogeneity is represented by all those unobservable but relevant components characterizing a 
region, which are expected to be correlated with observed factors. Examples of region-specific factors are wildfire 
deterrence mechanism, land use and type, the presence of organized crime. While these instances represent a persistent 
problem in cross-sectional analysis, using panel data estimation techniques allow us to control for the regional 
heterogeneity. 
The analysis in the first step of our research reveals how the conditional mean of the wildfire crime distribution responds 
to unit changes of different risk factors.  In the model selection procedure several model specifications have been considered 
and the most parsimonious models have been selected using commonly used model selection criteria.  Focusing on the 
central moment of the wildfire distribution allows us to easily estimate a relatively large number of models and accordingly 
establish which of the model specifications best describe the data at hand. However, a possible drawback of this type of 
analysis is that the conditional-mean framework does not allow us to consider the noncentral location of the crime 
distribution, which may be of interest for the objective of this paper. Accordingly, in the second step of our empirical 
analysis we complement the estimation results obtained from the fixed effect Poisson model by employing the fixed effect 
quantile regression model suggested in Machado et al. (2019). Quantile regression models are procedures for estimating a 
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functional relationship between the response variable and the explanatory variables for all portions of the probability 
distribution (see Koenker, 2004). Therefore, the quantile regression analysis allows us to investigate if the social-economic 
risk factors considered in this work have greater impact on lower or upper tails of the crime distribution function.  
The estimation results in the first two steps of our investigation reveal that there is an important relationship between 
socio-economic factors and wildfire crime. In particular, we find a statistically significant positive relationship between 
poverty and wildfire crime. Also, risk factors such unemployment, organised crime and income inequality affect the 
probability of crime in the same direction. On the other side, a statistically significant negative relationship between the 
level of education, broadly defined, and wildfire crime has been found.  The quantile regression analysis reveals that socio-
economic risk factors are particularly binding in the poorer Southern regions. Accordingly, in the third phase of our research 
we proceed to investigate the relationship between the business cycle and wildfire crime by calculating the time varying 
correlation between income and wildfire crime. The results support our conjecture that economic downturns have a 
significant impact on the type of environmental crime considered in this paper, thus confirming the findings of other 
empirical works in the crime literature. 
This paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First it provides an extensive analysis on how socio-economic 
risk factors affect wildfire crime. In the literature, despite the progress in knowledge made with studying the physical facets 
of the phenomenon, causes of human-related wildfire remain mostly unknown. While other variables associated to fire 
hazard such as climate change are increasingly investigated, empirical works on the socio-economic factors influencing 
wildland arson are quite limited. However, given the importance of human risk, any improvement in the modelling and 
assessment of factors that drive human-made ignitions is critical for fire prevention, planning and management. The 
proposed methodological approach is the second contribution of the paper. Poisson and quantile regression models allow 
the researcher to account for heterogeneous covariates effects, while the availability of panel data allows us to include fixed 
effects to control for unobserved covariates. Third, in this paper we make an attempt to investigate the relationship between 
business cycle and wildfire crime cycle.  Almost all previous empirical work relating to the wildfire modelling is based on 
climate cycles, however, the well stablished literature on cyclical behavior of macroeconomic fundamentals suggests that 
the  behavior of wildfire crime patterns should stem from the properties of socio-economic determinants such as 
unemployment, poverty or income inequality, which are all overwhelmingly cyclical.  
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, some theoretical background on the socio-economic 
determinants of crime is introduced. In Section 3, the results of several models relating to the socio-economic determinants 
of wildfire are presented. In Section 4, the results of quantile fixed effect regression are presented. In Section 5, the effects 
of economic downturns are considered. Finally, in Section 6, some concluding remarks are given. 
 
2. Theoretical Background of the Determinants of Crime 
 
The crime literature suggests that socio-economic factors play a major role in the decision by individuals of undertaking 
criminal activity. However, consensus view agrees that there is no single factor identifying the cause of crime, but rather a 
number of determinants that interacting induce a social actor in engaging in crime activity. In this paper, we consider few 
main drivers analyzed in previous studies which are likely to be correlated to other omitted factors: i) income inequality, 
ii) poverty, iii) unemployment and labour market conditions, iv) education, and v) organized crime. Below we analyze 
them in turn in the context of the related literature.  
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The study on the effect of income inequality on crime was pioneered in the seminal paper by Becker (1968). The author 
argues that for a given probability of apprehension and expected punishment, higher levels of inequality would increase 
the expected benefit of committing a crime for the relatively disadvantaged.  In a similar theoretical framework Fajnzylber 
et al. (2002) suggest that the effect of income inequality in society is strongly related to the individual's relative income 
position. Fajnzylber et al. (2002) argue that in the case of the wealthy, it is unlikely that an increase in inequality induces 
them to commit crimes. However, for poorer social actors, an increase in inequality may be crime inducing. This is because 
such an increase implies a larger gap between the wages of the poor and those of the rich, thus reflecting a larger difference 
between the income from criminal and legal activities. The idea that inequality causes crime finds support in several 
theoretical works (see for example Ehrlich, 1973; Imrohoroglu et al., 2000). However, strong theoretical models are not 
always supported by empirical evidence. The results of empirical studies reveal mixed evidence of the positive relation 
between crime rate and inequality. While some have found evidence of a positive relationship between inequality and crime 
(e.g. Enamorado et al., 2016; Harris and Vermaak, 2015; Coccia, 2017; Fajnzylber et al., 2002), others have failed to find 
any significant relationship (Bourguignon et al., 2000; Neumayer, 2005).  
Coming to poverty, although there is little empirical work specifically related to wildfire crime, the literature on the 
effect of poverty on crime is relevant in this context. The economic theory of crime suggests that individuals are more 
likely to become involved in criminal activity when they experience a negative income shock. In his seminal work 
Grossman (1991) frames the relation between crime and poverty in terms of the opportunity cost framework. The author 
argues that decreasing income levels reduce the opportunity cost of engaging in crime with respect to other legal economic 
activities (see also Seter, 2016). Similarly, the literature on the socio-economic determinants of criminal behaviour suggests 
a strong relationship between labour market conditions and crime. Grogger (1998) estimates a structural model of time 
allocation between criminal, labour market, and other non-market activities and finds strong evidence that higher wages 
deter criminal activity. Grogger’s (1998) empirical findings show that young men are responsive to wage incentives and 
that the racial differential in crime rate is in part attributable to labour market. Similarly, Gould et al. (2002) find that labour 
market conditions and especially wages are strongly related to crime rate for those most likely to commit crime (i.e. less 
educated men).  
The relationship between crime and labour market conditions is typically studied by looking at unemployment. In the 
theoretical literature the relationship between unemployment and crime is grounded in the notion the individuals respond 
to incentives. This view rests on the assumption that a rational offender should compare the costs and returns of engaging 
in illegal activities and make decisions accordingly. As rising unemployment reduces the opportunity cost of committing 
a crime, illegal income become more appealing. In this respect, theoretical models predict a strong positive relationship 
between unemployment and the propensity to commit crime (see for example, Grogger, 2000).  Despite this compelling 
theoretical argument, empirical studies on the relationship between wildfire crime and unemployment have found mixed 
results. For example, Maingi and Henry (2007) found no relationship between fire occurrence and unemployment (see also 
Sebastian-Lopez et al. 2008; Martınez et al., 2009; and Lovreglio et al. 2010), whereas Prestemon and Butry (2005) showed 
that arson fires and unemployment were related. A recent strand of literature looks at an indirect relation between labour 
market and wildfire crime. This literature suggests that forests have been voluntarily set on fire to create firefighting jobs 
or to gain land for agriculture and pasture, which were retained more valuable than logging (Leone et al., 2002). 
Looking now at education attainment, an individual's education level may impact on the decision to commit a crime in 
several ways. The literature has highlighted three main channels. First, there is an income effect that is positively related 
to education. Higher levels of education attainment may be associated to increasing returns of legitimate work and raising 
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the opportunity costs of illegal behaviour (Lochner, 2004; Lochner and Moretti, 2004). Second, resources allocated to 
education create time constraints that work as deterrent for criminal offences. Tauchen et al. (1994) investigate this “self-
incapacitation effect” and found that time spent in education is negatively correlated to the probability conviction among 
youngsters. Hjalmarsson (2008) looks at the impact of being arrested before finishing school on the probability of 
graduating from high school and find that the probability of a young person being convicted for crime greatly increase the 
likelihood of becoming a high school dropout. Third, a stream of literature also associates greater education with higher 
life satisfaction which in turn reduces the probability of committing a crime. For example, Oreopoulos (2007) and Lochner 
(2004) suggest that higher levels of education increase risk aversion, thus lowering crime. In an interesting paper Usher 
(1997) argues that education promotes a “civilization effect” which contributes to reduce the incidence of criminal activity. 
The author argues that education conveys a civic externality, a benefit to society over and above the benefit to the student 
in enhancing his future earning power. 
Despite the paucity of empirical studies in the environmental crime related literature, the relation between education 
attainments and wildfire crime appears to be supportive of findings in mainstream crime research. For example, Michetti 
et al. (2019) analysed the determinants of monthly variations in forest fire for Italian regions between 2000 and 2011 and 
concluded that education attainment played an important role in preventing fraudulent activity. Similarly, De Torres Curth 
et al. (2012) found that the areas with fewer fires tend to be characterized by population with higher levels of education. 
As far as organized crime is concerned, studies on the relationship between organized crime and wildfire crime are rare. 
This is probably due to poor data availability. One of the few empirical works considering this relationship is the EFFACE 
(2016) report where evidence is found of a positive relation between organized crime (i.e., mafia-like organizations) and 
number of fire crimes. The influence of organized crime is reported to be stronger in Italy’s Southern regions, where the 
government’s ability to enforce the law is weaker. The literature on environmental crime mainly concentrates on the 
growing role of organized crime on other types of environmental crimes. This is particularly the case of illegal dumping 
and international illegal trafficking of hazardous waste, where it was found that organised mafia-like criminals play a 
significant role in the environmental criminality (see for example Germani et al., 2018).  
 
 
3. Model Specification 
 
Let WFit  be the wildfire crime count in the region i at time t. Consistent with the relevant literature (see for example 
Ganteaume et al., 2013 and the references therein) we partition the 𝑘𝑘 × 1 vector of risk factors, Zit , as 
 
                                                      𝑍𝑍′𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = [𝑋𝑋′𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑌𝑌′𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖],                                                      (1) 
 
where the entry elements of the vector 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 are the covariates for social vulnerability risk factors and 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  is a vector of 
control variables that includes demographic and environmental risk factors. In particular, the vector 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 includes risk factors 
related to income inequality, poverty, violence, educational attainments and labor market conditions. Below, we describe 
the risk factors in Eq. (1) in turn.  
Starting with income inequality two proxies for this covariate were considered: i) the Gini coefficient, (GINIit) and ii) 
the disposable income inequality, (INERit). The Gini coefficient has often been used in the literature to investigate the 
relationship between crime and income inequality (see for example Fajnzylber et al., 2002), however this index may be 
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biased toward the central part of the income distribution. Therefore, in addition to the Gini coefficient, the income quintile 
share was also considered as a proxy for income inequality. The variable INERt is defined as the ratio of total income 
received by the 20% of the population with the highest income to that received by the 20% of the population with the 
lowest income. According to ISTAT, the variable was calculated using an income equivalent factor to account for the 
heterogeneity of family compositions such as different needs between children and adults for example or economies of 
scale generated by sharing the same dwelling. Therefore, it may be suitable to reflect the regional heterogeneity of income 
inequality on wildfire crime rate.  
Closely related to income inequality is poverty risk. In this case two proxy variables for poverty were considered: i) 
proportion of household in economic distress, and ii) the proportion of household leaving in severe material deprivation. 
However, due to the high correlation between these two variables (the calculated correlation coefficient is above 80%), 
and with the aim of reducing the number of regressors in the estimation, we used principal component analysis over these 
two indicators to construct a composite measure of poverty risk. The resulting risk factor is referred to as POVit.  
Household wealth and labour market conditions were considered inserting in the model covariates for unemployment 
rate, UNEMit, per capita disposable income, INCit, and employment rate in non-agricultural sector, EMPLit. To capture the 
effect of educational attainment on wildfire crime two covariates were used: i) the rate of population with a upper secondary 
level of education, EDUCit, and ii) the rate of population with tertiary education, UNIVit. The rational for including two 
proxy variables for education attainment is that we expect the return of education on income to be higher for individuals 
with a university degree. Accordingly, analysing the effect of these two covariates allow us to investigate the magnitude 
of the “civilization effect” on wildfire hazard described in Usher (1997).  
The last risk factor considered is the level of violence. Also in this case, two proxies for violence were considered: i) 
homicide rate, (HOMRit), and ii) organized crime, (ORGCit) defined as the conviction rate for organized and mafia-related 
crime. The rationale for including homicide rate as well as organized crime convictions is that the latter variable is likely 
to suffer from a significant measurement error. Organized crime is a difficult phenomenon to capture and using the number 
of trials for organized crime as the sole covariate to capture the impact of organized crime on wildfire crime may not be 
informative. In this respect, the inclusion of the covariate “homicide rate” may be useful to signal a significant presence of 
organized crime in a region. Clearly, the overall homicide rate does not distinguish between homicides committed by 
criminal organizations and other homicides. On the other hand, it is unlikely to suffer from measurement error and it allows 
us to test the hypothesis that the degree of violence in a region has an effect on the occurrence of wildfire crime.  
Coming to the control variables, the entry elements of vector Yit in Eq. (1) are weather related and demographic risk 
factors: 
 
Yit = [𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ,𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ,𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ,𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖], 
 
where RAINit is the annual precipitation in mm, 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the temperature, measured as average highest temperature, DENit 
is the population density, and AGRIit is the proportion of population in agricultural employment.  
In general weather conditions that cause downward changes in fuel moisture and, consequently, upward changes in fuel 
availability are expected to increase the probability of wildfire occurrence (see Albertson et al. 2009; Plucinski,  2014; Guo 
et al. 2016). Similarly, higher mean and maximum temperatures are expected to have a positive relation with wildfire (see 
Preisler et al. 2004; Carvalho et al. 2008; Vilar et al. 2010). In the fire related literature an increase of population density 
has been positively related to wildfire crime. For example, Catry et al. (2007) observed that the large majority of the fire 
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ignitions in Portugal occurred in the municipalities with the highest population densities. Gonzalez-Olabarria et al. (2015) 
found that the distribution of arson in North Eastern Spain occurred near coastal areas, where the population density was 
higher. Similarly Romero-Calcerrada et al. (2008) found evidence of a positive relationship between the intensive use of 
the territory and the ignitions in forest areas in Spain (see also Padilla and Vega-Garcıa, 2011).   
Finally, socio-economic transformations in rural areas such as rural exodus, reduction in agricultural employment and 
abandonment of agricultural land may contribute to wildfire crime occurrence. In the related literature several empirical 
studies have found positive relation between fire occurrence and agricultural activities (see for example Martınez et al., 
2009; Rodrigues et al., 2016 among others). Accordingly, a covariate for the level agriculture employment in the region, 
AGRIit, was included in the model. 
 
3.1. Data  
 
For the empirical investigation we use annual data for the period 2006-2015 for the twenty Italian regions. We 
calculated crime rates on the basis of population data and the number of crimes reported by Italian Office for National 
Statistic (ISTAT) for the twenty Italian regions. In particular, the wildfire crime variable is the number of reported cases 
of deliberate wildfire with known offender plus the total cases of unknown offender. We decided to exclude unintentional 
forest fires to concentrate on the most severe form of deliberate wildfires.  
The time period under consideration was selected according the quality of the available data and by the availability of 
at least seven consecutive observations. Table 1 reports a description of the acronyms used and some descriptive statistics.    
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Table 1. Variable list and descriptive statistics. 
Variable Name Description Mean Standard Deviation 
    
WFit Arsons crime rate (per 100,000 persons) 10.63 13.37 
INERit Quintile share ratio (S80/S20) for disposable income: 
ratio between average income of the top quintile and 
average income of the bottom quintile 
 
5.04 1.08 
GINIit Gini index of household disposable income 0.31 0.02 
ORGCit Organized crime and mafia-related crime rate (per 
100,000 persons) 
 
2.07 1.51 
HOMRit Homicides rate per 100,000 inhabitants. 0.84 0.59 
EDUCit Percentage of the population aged 25–64 with secondary 
education attainment 
 
41.12 4.71 
UNIVit Percentage of the population aged 25–64 with tertiary 
education attainment 
 
15.26 2.67 
EMPLit Employment in non-agricultural sector for the working-
age population 
 
825458.7 802060.3 
INCit Per Capita Income 17462.4 3445.02 
POVit Principal component analysis of: i) proportion of 
household in economic distress, and ii) proportion of 
household leaving in severe material deprivation. 
 
9.75 1.00 
UNEMit Total unemployment rate 9.70 4.95 
DENit Population density 183.99 111.63 
RAINit Total precipitation in mm in a given year 826.67 201.88 
TEMPit Average maximum temperature in Celsius in a year 17.30 4.09 
AGRIit Percentage of employment rate in the agricultural sector 4.57 2.49 
Source: ISTAT: The National Institute for Statistics and authors’ calculations.  
 
 
3.2. Poisson Fixed Effect Analysis 
 
To investigate the effect of risk factors in Eq. (1) we consider a Poisson fixed effect panel model (for an excellent 
review see Cameron and Trivedi, 2013). In the cross-section context, Poisson-type models have been used to investigate 
many problems in criminology and criminal justice (see for example Osgood, 2000 and the references therein).  The 
advantage of using Poisson regression models is that the hypothesis of linearity is relaxed in the sense that a function of 
the mean of the observations is nonlinear in some set of covariates. The hypothesis of normality is also relaxed to the 
assumption that the distribution belongs to the exponential family. In the context of longitudinal data, the application of 
Poisson-type models is still limited. However, Poisson fixed effect models have been used for predicting the number of 
human-caused wildfire in Prestemon and Butry (2005); see also Levi and Bestelmeyer (2016); Marchal et al. (2017).  
Let 𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 be the wildfire crime count in the region i at time  𝑡𝑡. The conditional density function of 𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is defined as     
 
𝑓𝑓(𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖|𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) = 𝑒𝑒−𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖!  ,                                                                        (2) 
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where  𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a vector of k risk factors and 
 
𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ≡ 𝑇𝑇[𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖|𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ,𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖] = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒(𝑍𝑍′𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝛽𝛽),                                     (3) 
 
where 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 is the regional individual effect. The regional fixed effect controls for unobserved region-level heterogeneity, but 
𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 may be potentially correlated with the regressors 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖. However, consistent estimation of the parameters  𝛽𝛽 is possible 
by eliminating 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖  (for more details see Cameron and Trivedi, 2013). 
In Eq. (2) we assume that the arson outcome, in a region i at time t, is a count of arson crime, WFit. Because wildfire 
crime count are discrete and nonnegative events, for each region i, the stochastic process {𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖 , 𝑡𝑡 ≥ 0} satisfies the property 
that 𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖(𝑠𝑠) ≤ 𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) if 𝑠𝑠 < 𝑡𝑡, and 𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) −𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖(𝑠𝑠) is a number of events in the interval (𝑠𝑠, 𝑡𝑡].  
Under the assumption that the observations are independent, the conditional density function in Eq. (2) can be expressed 
as 
 
     𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃(𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑤𝑤𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖|𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) = 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒{− exp(𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝛽𝛽)}𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒(𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝛽𝛽)𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑤𝑤𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖!.⁄                   (4) 
 
Since the sum of 𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 Poisson independent random variables, each with parameter 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  for 𝑡𝑡 = 1, … . ,𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 is distributed as 
Poisson with parameters ∑ 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , the likelihood function can trivially be calculated from  Eq. (4). Thus, the model in Eq. (2) 
can be estimated by maximizing the conditional log likelihood  
 
             𝐿𝐿 = 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙∏ ��∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 �!∑ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒(𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝛽𝛽)𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖!�∑ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒(𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝛽𝛽)𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 �𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 �𝜗𝜗𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 ,                                    (5) 
 
where 𝜗𝜗𝑖𝑖 is the weight for region i. Assuming gamma heterogeneity the log likelihood function Eq. (5) reduces to 
 
𝐿𝐿 = �𝜗𝜗𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
�log Γ��𝑤𝑤𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖
𝑖𝑖=1
+ 1� −�𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙Γ(𝑤𝑤𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 1) + �𝑤𝑤𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛1
𝑖𝑖=1
𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖
𝑖𝑖=1
�, 
where 
𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 (𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝛽𝛽)∑ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 (𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝛽𝛽)𝑖𝑖 . 
 
Model Selection Procedure  
 
In Eq. (1) more than one proxy variable for a given socio-economic risk factor is considered. Accordingly, to estimate 
the expression in Eq. (2) we proceed following a general-to-specific modelling criteria and select the subset of best fitting 
models from a set of candidate specifications. Throughout the model selection procedure, the possible presence of 
multicollinearity was assessed using the eigenvalues of the different covariance matrices and computing the conditioning 
index (CI). Following Pena and Renegar (2000) the CI index is calculated as 
 
𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅 = �𝜆𝜆𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
𝜆𝜆𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛
                                                                (6) 
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 where 𝜆𝜆𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒 is the largest eigenvalue and 𝜆𝜆𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 the smallest eigenvalue of the variance covariance of the risk factor matrix 
Zit. If 𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅 = 1, then there is no evidence of collinearity between the covariates in the estimated model. However, as 
collinearity increases, the eigenvalues in Eq. (6) becomes both greater and smaller than 1 and the CI number increases. 
Pena and Renegar (2000) suggests 𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅 < 10  for a well-defined matrix as opposite to 11 < 𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅 < 30 for moderate 
multicollinearity. Accordingly, the condition we imposed for introducing a covariate in the final model specification was 
a calculated CI number less than 10.   
To select the best model specification, for each model, we calculated the Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC) scores 
and the Bayesian information criterion (BIC). AIC is an estimate of the relative Kullback–Leibler (KL) information loss 
in a specific model based on the data and is appropriate for model comparisonss. A lower AIC score indicates less KL 
information loss, and therefore a better specified model. AIC includes a penalty for the number of estimated parameters, 
which diminishes overfitting. The BIC criterion has a similar interpretation but is calculated using a different penalty for 
the number of parameters (see Burnham and Anderson 1998 for more details). Using these information criteria, we 
identified as the most plausible models the specification with the lowest AIC and BIC scores, among all models meeting 
the CI index condition. 
Coming to the model misspecification tests, the assumption of serially uncorrelated structure of the error term has been 
assessed by testing the null hypothesis that there is no serial correlation in residuals using the Hausman and Newey (1984) 
test. The test is based on the off-diagonal elements of the residual correlation matrix and is asymptotically 𝜒𝜒2-distributed. 
Failure to reject the null hypothesis of no first order autocorrelation indicates that the model is not well specified.  
 
3.3. Empirical Results 
 
In Table 2 the estimated coefficients of the four best fitting models are reported. We label the models as M1, M2, M3 
and M4, respectively. The estimated coefficients, along with the related robust standard errors, are reported in columns 2, 
4, 6 and 8, respectively. An asterisk next to the estimated parameter indicates the level of statistical significance of the 
estimated coefficients.  For easy of interpretation, the incidence rate ratios (IRR) are also reported in columns 3, 5,7, and 
9. To avoid clutter, the CI index for each estimated model is reported in Table 1A.   
In Table 2, model M1 and M3 include POVit as risk factor, whereas in models M2 and M4 the risk factor UNEMit is 
included in the model, but the covariate POVit is excluded. The reason for this specification is that these two covariates 
were found to be highly correlated and therefore only one risk factor at the time was considered. Similarly, the covariates 
EDUCit and UNIVit produced an high CI index. Accordingly, the former covariate was included in model M1 and M3, but 
excluded from model M2 and model M4. Surprisingly, the two proxies for violence, ORGCit and HOMRit, were not found 
to be highly correlated (the correlation coefficient is 0.31) and the CI index in all the estimated models was found to be 
less than 10. For this reason, both risk factors were included in the models.  
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          Table 2. Risk factors of wildfire crime rate.  
Risk Factors M1 M2 M3 M4 
 𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓 IRR 𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓 IRR 𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓 IRR 𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓 IRR 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 0.073** 
(0.362) 
1.076 0.012* 
(0.034) 
1.122 - - - - 
𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 - - - - 1.611* 
(0.060) 
5.010 1.380** 
(0.697) 
3.973 
𝑂𝑂𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 0.070* 
(0.008) 
1.072 0.064* 
(0.011) 
1.067 0.063* 
(0.006) 
1.065 0.067* 
(0.011) 
1.070 
𝐻𝐻𝑂𝑂𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 0.239** 
(0.222) 
1.270 0.071 
(0.090) 
1.074 0.188** 
(0.806) 
1.207 0.082 
(0.110) 
1.085 
𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 -0.084* 
(0.029) 
0.919 - - -0.013 
(0.035) 
0.986 - - 
𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 - - -0.079* 
(0.028) 
0.923 - - -0.074** 
(0.029) 
0.929 
EMPLit - - - - -2.608* 
(0.804) 
0.074 - - 
INCit - - - - - - -3.587** 
(1.192) 
0.027 
POVit 0.092** 
(0.041) 
1.096 - - 0.093** 
(0.041) 
1.097 - - 
UNEMit - - 0.031* 
(0.009) 
1.031 - - 0.041** 
(0.012) 
1.042 
DENit 0.031 
(0.032) 
1.031 0.026 
(0.020) 
1.026 0.022 
(0.024) 
1.023 0.021 
(0.021) 
1.021 
RAINit -0.001* 
(0.000) 
0.998 -0.001* 
(0.000) 
0.998 -0.001* 
(0.000) 
0.998 -0.001* 
(0.000) 
0.998 
TEMPit 0.109*** 
(0.098) 
1.115 0.135** 
(0.061) 
1.145 0.121 
(0.086) 
1.129 0.139** 
(0.051) 
1.149 
AGRIit -0.610*** 
(0.357) 
0.543 -0.626*** 
(0.373) 
0.534 -0.504*** 
(0.308) 
0603 -0.583*** 
(0.245) 
0.557 
         
Pseudo Lik. -288.69  -298.13  -282.37  -298.37  
Serial Corr.  0.567  0.452  0.891  0.826  
AIC 595.39  614.26  817.30  614.97  
BIC 622.42  641.93  846.18  645.69  
         
Note: The table report the estimated coefficients of the Poisson fixed effect panel (robust standard errors are presented in 
parentheses below their corresponding coefficients) with dependent variable 𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖. Asterisks *), **), ***) denote statistical 
significance at 1%; 5%; and 10%, respectively.  
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From Table 2 it appears that there is a positive relation between income inequality and wildfire crime as the estimated 
signs for INERit and GINIit  in models M1-M4 are uniformly positive and the estimated coefficients are statistically 
significant. Following the theoretical model in Becker (1968) the positive effect of income inequality on the wildfire crime 
can be interpreted according to the cost-benefit framework where the magnitude of the income inequality coefficient 
measures the impact of the difference between the returns to crime and its opportunity cost (as measured by the legal 
income of the most poorer individuals). However, this argument purely based on rational behavior of agents, in the case of 
environmental crime may underestimate the importance of the social-economic environment in which social actors interact. 
Following Fajnzylber (2002), an alternative interpretation of the positive link between inequality and crime is that in 
regions with higher income inequality, individuals have lower expectations of lifetime improvement of their social-
economic status through legal economic activities, which would decrease the opportunity cost of participating in illegal 
endeavors more generally.  
The estimated coefficients of the income inequality covariates are not only statistically significant, but they are also 
important in magnitude. This is particularly the case for the Gini coefficients estimated in models M3 and M4. The 
incidence rate ratios indicate that the probability of fire crime occurrence is between four (model M3) and five time (model 
M4) higher in regions with higher income inequality with respect to regions that enjoy a lower Gini coefficient.   
Coming to the effect of violence, the estimated coefficients for ORGCit are positive and statistically significant 
throughout the estimated models, whereas the estimated parameters for HOMRit are of the expected sign, but significant 
only in models M2 and M3. The magnitude of the estimated coefficient for ORGCit does not varies much throughout the 
estimated models and the incidence rate ratios indicate that in regions with higher rate of arrest for organized crime the 
probability of wildfire crime is also approximately 1.07 higher than regions with lower rate of arrest for organized crime. 
This result is significant since according to a report by the Italian Antimafia Directorate environmental crime is currently 
one of the most profitable forms of criminal activity and eco-mafia has become a big business in the waste sector in Italy 
(see Savona and Riccardi, 2018).  Previous literature has found that organized criminal networks are involved in the illegal 
disposal of commercial, industrial and radioactive waste (see for example Germani et al., 2018). However, the relation 
between organized crime and wildfire crime has not been previously investigated. Bearing in mind that organised crime is 
deeply rooted in Italy this result may have important implications on crime deterrence policy. 
Looking at the role of education, the results in Table 2 suggest that there is a negative relationship between education 
attainment and wildfire crime count throughout the estimated models. In model M1 a percentage increase in secondary 
education leads to a decrease of 8% in wildfire crime, which translate to an incidence ratio rate of approximately 0.92.  
This reduction increases to 13% in model M3 and the incidence ratio falls to 0.08, accordingly. This result suggests that 
the “civilization effect” discussed in the crime literature is also an important deterrent for wildfire crime. Looking at the 
effect of tertiary education in models M2 and M4, the estimated coefficients are not very different in magnitude with 
respect to those in model M1 and M3. A negative relation between education level and fire risk is also found to be 
significant in De Torres Curth et al. (2012). 
Coming to unemployment, the estimated parameters in models M2 and M4 support the view that a worsening of labour 
market conditions increase the probability of wildfire crime count. In general, the findings in Table 2 confirm previous 
empirical results in the related literature that unemployment is an important risk factor in causing wildfire crime (see Mercer 
and Prestemon, 2005; Prestemon and Butry, 2005; Martınez et al., 2009). More specifically, in model M2 a percentage 
decrease in unemployment leads to a decrease about 3% in wildfire crime; model M3 reports similar results. Similarly, an 
increase in per capita income reduces the incidence of wildfire crime rate in model M3.      
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Looking now at the demographic risk factor, we do not find evidence that an increase of population density increases 
the probability of crime count, as the estimated coefficients are not significant in all the estimated models. This result may 
be due to the fact that the nonlinear specification of the Poisson model may not be the best specification to capture the 
influence of this covariate.  
Coming to the weather related factors, from Table 2 it appears that weather conditions play a significant role in the 
wildfire crime count as the estimated coefficients are significant and of the expected sign.  It is well known that the 
Mediterranean summer weather conditions (high temperature, prolonged drought periods and strong winds) facilitate 
wildfire occurrence; see for example Vasilakos et al. (2008) among others. In this respect, the results in Table 2 mainly 
confirm the results in the related literature.  
Finally, looking at the estimated coefficient for AGRIit, it appears that an increase of agricultural employment strongly 
reduces the probability of wildfire crime. This may be due to the conservation and land management role that farmers play 
in rural areas. These results are in agreement with Martinez et al. (2009) where land abandonment and rural exodus were 
found to be positively related to wildfire occurrence.   
The bottom panel of Table 2 reports the p-values for the serial correlation test discussed in the previous section. The 
results show that all the estimated models pass the misspecification test, as the null hypothesis of serial correlation is 
rejected in all cases. Furthermore, the AIC and BIC information criteria suggest that the best fitting specifications are model 
M1 and M2, since they have the lower score than models M3 and M4.     
To summarize, the estimation results provide evidence that supports theoretical prediction in Section 2. In particular, 
we found a statistically significant and positive relationship between poverty and wildfire crime. Risk factors such 
unemployment, organized crime and income inequality affect the probability of crime in the same direction. On the other 
side, a negative and statistically significant relationship between the level of education, broadly defined, and wildfire crime 
has been found.  These findings are important since they are in line with the results for other type of environmental crimes 
examined in the literature (see for example Sedova, 2016). 
 
4. Quantile Based Estimation of Wildfire Crime and Socio-Economic Factors   
 
Above the relationship between wildfire crime and social-economic factors has been investigated. However, we 
consider an heterogeneous group of Italian regions with quite different economic performance over time (see Figure 1A in 
Appendix). The North-South divide has been a distinctive feature of the Italian economic development since the beginning 
of the 20th century. Historically, the gap in term of GDP growth was relatively small just after the country unification in 
1861, but it increased steadily over time so much so that by the 1950s it was close to 50% of the GDP per capita in the 
Centre-North, and it never significantly changed thereafter, ranging from 55% to 60% until the present day (see Musolino, 
2018). Labour productivity has also historically been significantly lower in Southern Italy. Similarly, high unemployment 
rate has contributed to maintain a significant gap in income inequality and poverty rate with respect to the Northern and 
Central regions. Not only the North-South divide constitutes a main source of heterogeneity, but differences in term of 
economic development and economic performance are quite remarkable also within the macro-regions.  Notably, Central 
and Northern regions have been the core of Italian economic development since the end of Second World War, but the 
development model was quite different. On one side, the North-Western regions had a development model based on Fordist 
organization heavily relying on large firms and heavy industry. On the other side, economic growth in the North Eastern 
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regions was based on the industrial district model (see for example A’Hearn and Venables, 2013). Different models of 
economic developments have brought about important differences in term of income distributions and inequality.  
Against this background, a number of questions naturally arise. Is there a regional effect of wildfire crimes in Italy? 
Has the heterogenous distribution of wealth across regions affected the occurrence of environmental crimes such as 
wildfire?  In other words, if socio-economic factors are important drivers of crime, we should see greater crime level in 
poorer and more inequal regions. A related question is therefore, does an increase of risk factors analyzed in the previous 
section have similar impact across Italian regions?   
To tackle the research questions above we consider the properties of the cumulate distribution functions of wildfire 
crime and the related socio-economic determinants. To be more specific, we consider the distribution function of each 
element of the vector 
 
𝑋𝑋� = [𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊, 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅,𝑂𝑂𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶,𝐻𝐻𝑂𝑂𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅,𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸,𝑇𝑇𝑂𝑂𝑈𝑈,𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇, 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶 ]. 
 
Note that, to simplify the notation, the i and t subscripts for each variable have been dropped below. Let j (for 𝑗𝑗 =1, … ,8)  be an element of the vector 𝑋𝑋�, then for any j we can define  𝑊𝑊𝑗𝑗(𝑋𝑋�) = 𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃{𝑋𝑋� ≤ 𝑒𝑒}  as the distribution function of 
𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗  and the quantile function as 
 
𝑄𝑄𝑗𝑗(𝑒𝑒) = 𝑊𝑊−1(𝑒𝑒) = inf{𝑒𝑒|𝑊𝑊(𝑒𝑒) ≥ 𝑒𝑒}, 
 
with 𝑒𝑒 ∈ [0,1]. For each element of 𝑋𝑋�  let the proportion of total outcome that falls into the quantile interval (𝑄𝑄𝑗𝑗,𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖−1 ,𝑄𝑄𝑗𝑗,𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖), 
for 𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙−1 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙  be 
 
𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗(𝑒𝑒𝑗𝑗,𝑙𝑙−1,𝑒𝑒𝑗𝑗,𝑙𝑙) = ∫ 𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥𝑊𝑊(𝑒𝑒)−∫ 𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥𝑊𝑊(𝑒𝑒)𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖−1−∞𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖−∞ ∫ 𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥𝑊𝑊(𝑒𝑒)∞−∞ .                              (7) 
 
The expression in Eq. (7) defines the quantile shares and it allows us to investigate the shares of total outcome 
pertaining to the population segment from relative rank  𝑄𝑄𝑗𝑗,𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖−1  to relative rank 𝑄𝑄𝑗𝑗,𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 in the list of ordered outcomes. 
Table 3 reports the estimates of the quantile shares of each element of the vector 𝑋𝑋� and the related estimated standard 
errors. In particular, the fist column reports the factors of the vector 𝑋𝑋�, whereas in columns 2-11 the estimated proportion 
of the total outcome that falls into each quantile are described.  For ease of interpretation, the proportions are reported in 
percentage and the quantile are expressed in term of percentile shares. 
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Table 3. Estimated proportions of total outcome by percentile share in percentage. 
Risk Factors Quantiles 
 
 
 
10% 
 
20% 
 
30% 
 
40% 
 
50% 
 
60% 
 
70% 
 
80% 
 
90% 
 
100% 
 
WF 0.73   
(0.110) 
1.54   
(0.183) 
2.25    
(0.249) 
3.30   
(0.377) 
4.89   
(0.469) 
6.57   
(0.538) 
9.43   
(0.689) 
12.29   
(0.707) 
17.22    
(0.817) 
41.73   
(2.782) 
INER 7.66   
(0.112) 
8.18   
(0.111) 
8.58   
(0.112) 
8.90   
(0.109) 
9.21   
(0.101) 
9.56   
(0.127) 
10.12   
(0.111) 
10.86   
(0.127) 
12.03   
(0.195) 
14.85   
(0.474) 
ORC 2.39   
(0.474) 
4.88   
(0.255) 
5.75   
(0.297) 
6.79   
(0.307) 
7.75   
(0.305) 
8.88   
(0.348) 
10.55   
(0.437) 
12.40   
(0.452) 
15.44   
(0.551) 
25.14   
(2.140) 
HOMR 1.89   
(0.427) 
4.32   
(0.504) 
6.05   
(0.319) 
7.13   
(0.340) 
7.67   
(0.331) 
9.13     
(0.344) 
10.48   
(0.362) 
12.10   
(0.445) 
14.69   
(0.471) 
26.52   
(1.764) 
EDU 7.93   
(0.064) 
8.52   
(0.087) 
9.12   
(0.123) 
9.64   
(0.086) 
10.03   
(0.047) 
10.34   
(0.057) 
10.64   
(0.055) 
10.88   
(0.064) 
11.17   
(0.070) 
11.67   
(0.102) 
POV 2.89   
(0.141) 
3.84   
(0.200) 
4.79   
(0.210) 
5.74   
(0.208) 
6.96   
(0.307) 
8.62   
(0.359) 
11.89   
(0.735) 
15.07   
(0.455) 
18.09   
(0.484) 
22.08   
(0.822) 
UNEM 3.48   
(0.171) 
4.92    
(0.216) 
5.95   
(0.266) 
7.24   
(0.249) 
8.43   
(0.242) 
9.75    
(0.263) 
11.24   
(0.255) 
12.84   
(0.250) 
14.90   
(0.564) 
21.19   
(0.596) 
 
 
From Table 3 it appears that wildfire crime density function is highly skewed, since approximately 60% of wildfire 
crimes are concentrated in regions that are located in the higher quantiles of the cumulate distribution function. Namely, 
regions in the top 30th quantile account for approximately 60% of the proportion of the wildfire crime in the sample under 
consideration. On the other side, regions in the bottom 30th quantile only get less than 5% of wildfire crime. It is interesting 
to note that the distributions of ORGC and HOMR and most of the other socio-economic indicators seem to follow a similar 
pattern. In particular, from Table 3 it appears that the regions in the in top 30th quantiles have 52.98% of organized crime 
convictions and 53.31% of homicides out of the total crimes, respectively. This contrast with regions in the bottom 30th 
quantile where the percentile shares decreases to 13.02% for organized crime convictions and 12.26% for homicide 
prosecutions, respectively. Similarly, the distribution of poverty and unemployment are highly skewed, with the top 30% 
worst performing regions in the sample receiving 55.24% and 48.93% of the total share in term of poverty and 
unemployment, respectively.  Looking at INER, the ratio between average income of the top quintile and the average 
income of the bottom quintile is also a left tailed distribution with 37.74% of the share being in the higher top 30th quantiles. 
Finally, the education distribution seems to be quite uniform across Italian regions, with only marginal differences between 
top and worst performing regions.  
 
4.1. Quantile Fixed Effect Regression Analysis 
 
In the previous section we have investigated the role of socio-economic risk factors and other control variables on the 
probability of wildfire crime occurrence. With this target in mind, we have considered the effects of the risk factors in the 
𝑘𝑘 × 1 vector 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 of Eq. (1) on the conditional mean of 𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖. The econometric model used to estimate Eq. (2) allows us to 
answer the question of whether a given risk factor considered on the right hand side of the equation affects the conditional 
mean of  𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖. However, in the light of the results in Table 3, the focus on the conditional mean of the WF distribution 
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may hide important features of the relation between the socio-economic risk factors under consideration and the level of 
observed crime. Accordingly, in this section we are interested in answering a related question: Does a one unit increase of 
a given risk factor of vector 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 in Eq. (1) affects regions with lower wild crime rate differently from regions with higher 
fire crime rate? In other words, do risk factors have a different impact on the probability of wildfire crime occurrence in 
regions at the bottom quantile with respect to regions in the top quantile? 
To consider if the marginal effects of vulnerability factors in vector 𝑍𝑍 are different for regions that are in the top quantile 
of the WF distribution with respect to regions that are in the bottom quantile we focus on the estimation of  𝑄𝑄𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑒𝑒│𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖). 
Unlike the relationship in Eq. (2), where only the conditional distribution of 𝑇𝑇�𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖|𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖� was considered, we now take 
into account the functional relationship between wildfire crime and socio-economic risk factors for each portion of the 
probability distribution function. With this target in mind we estimate the conditional quantiles 𝑄𝑄𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊(𝑒𝑒│𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖) using a model 
of the form 
 
𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝑍𝑍′𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖β + (𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 + 𝑇𝑇′𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝛾𝛾)ε𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, 
 
with Pr(𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 + 𝑇𝑇′𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝛾𝛾 > 0) ,  and M is a 𝜁𝜁-vector of known differentiable (with probability 1) transformations of the 
components of  𝑍𝑍 with element l given by 𝑇𝑇𝑙𝑙 = 𝜙𝜙𝑙𝑙(𝑍𝑍).  The p-th conditional quantile function of the response 𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 can 
be represented as  
 
𝑄𝑄𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖�𝑒𝑒�𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖� = �𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑄𝑄(𝑒𝑒)�+  𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖′𝛽𝛽 + 𝑇𝑇′𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖𝛾𝛾𝑄𝑄(𝑒𝑒).                 (8) 
 
where the parameters (𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 , 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖), 𝑖𝑖 =  1, . . . ,𝑛𝑛, capture the i-region fixed effects so that the scalar coefficient 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖(𝑒𝑒 ) ≡ 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 +
𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑄𝑄(𝑒𝑒) the quantile-p fixed effect for region i. 
The model in Eq. (8) can be estimated using the method of moment-quantile regression as suggested in Machado and 
Santos Silva (2019). The proposed estimation method is closely related to that of Chernozhukov and Hansen (2008) in the 
sense that under suitable regularly conditions it identifies the same structural quantile function, but it has the advantage of 
being computationally simpler to estimate. Moreover, the estimation method allows the individual effects to affect the 
entire distribution, rather than being just location shifters as in the earlier models in Koenker (2004) and Canay (2011); see 
Machado and Santos Silva (2019) for more details.  
Table 4 reports the estimated parameters for the quantiles p ∈ {0.1, … , 0.90} along with the associated standard errors. 
Note that the results in Table 4 only relate to models M1 and M2 as these two models beat the specification in models M3 
and M4 according to the BIC and AIC information criteria. In Table 4, column 2-10 report the estimated coefficients and 
the relative robust standard errors.  
Looking at the results in Table 4 it appears that, the estimated coefficients of income inequality are positive and 
significantly different from zero only for regions above the 40th and 50th quantile of the WF distribution, for model M1 and 
M2 respectively. Therefore, the effect of income inequality on wildfire crime only becomes a risk factor when the 
difference between the average income of the top quintile of the population and average income of the bottom quintile is 
relatively high. This effect is also reflected in the magnitude of the estimated coefficients for INERit, as the estimated 
parameters are relatively low for regions below the median quantile of the WF distribution; but increase sharply for those 
regions located in the top quantile. Therefore, the marginal effect on WF of one unit increase of INER in regions in the top 
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quantile is much greater than the marginal effect in regions that enjoy the desirable position at the bottom quantile.  Coming 
to the impact of unemployment and poverty, the positive signs of the estimated parameters confirm the results in Table 2. 
However, it appears that, in this case, these risk factors are important even for regions that are at the bottom quantile of the 
WF distribution, as the estimated parameters for both POVit and UNEMit are statistically significant for all, but the 90th  
quantile. Note that very high (low) quantiles are notoriously difficult to estimate accurately since there are relative fewer 
observations in the tails of the distribution. This is probably the reason why the estimated coefficient of UNEMit for the 
90th quantile is found to be not significantly different from zero. 
Looking at the effect of organized crime and homicide rates, once again, in Table 4 the estimated coefficients have 
positive signs denoting a positive relation between wildfire crime and violence, broadly defined. However, while the 
estimated coefficient for ORGCit is significant only for regions that are above the 30th and 40th quantile of the wildfire 
crime distribution (for model M1 and M2 respectively); the covariate HOMRit presents estimated parameters that are 
significant throughout the estimated quantiles. This result highlights the fact that wildfire crime is strongly related to local 
criminal organizations, thus confirming the literature findings for other types of environmental crimes (see for example 
Germani et al., 2018).  
Considering the effect of education on wildfire crime, the results are mixed. From Table 4a it appears that EDUCit has 
the expected negative signs throughout the estimated quantiles when model M1 is considered. However, the estimated 
parameters are not statistically significant. For model M2, in Table 4b, the estimated coefficients have the expected signs 
for the higher quantiles, but the estimated coefficients are not significantly different from zero. These results contrast with 
the findings in Table 3 where the level of education was found to be significant and of negative sign. One reason for the 
result in Table 4 is that the linearity assumption made in Eq. (8) may be less suitable to describe the relation between this 
covariate and the dependent variable. Similarly, the control factor RAINit has the correct sign, but the estimated coefficients 
are not significantly different from zero throughout the estimate quantiles. This result is probably due to the fact that the 
heterogeneity of the rain distribution across Italian regions makes the relation between wildfire occurrence and rain 
genuinely nonlinear.  
The estimated coefficients of DENit have negative signs and are statistically significant. These results contrast with the 
findings in Table 2 where the estimated parameters for this covariate were found to be not significantly different from zero.  
However, the estimated coefficients for population density change very little across quantiles, both in Table 4a and Table 
4b. Moreover, the magnitude of the estimated parameters is between 0.004 and 0.005, meaning that a unit increase in 
population density increase the wildfire crime between 0.4% and 0.5%. Such small estimated parameters cast some doubts 
on the actual impact of this covariate on wildfire crime for the data at hand.  Finally, the effect of employment in the 
agricultural sector present mixed results as it is not significant in model M1, but significant up to the 80th quantile and 
with the correct sign for model M2. 
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Table 4. Wildfire crime and vulnerability factors using fixed effect quantile estimation. 
Risk Factors  Quantiles    
 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 0.116 
(0.153) 
0.128 
(0.133) 
0.147 
(0.103) 
0.159*** 
(0.089) 
0.174** 
(0.080) 
0.188** 
(0.083) 
0.198** 
(0.091) 
0.210** 
(0.105) 
0.232*** 
(0.140) 
𝑂𝑂𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 0.110 
(0.091) 
0.111 
(0.078) 
0.115*** 
(0.061) 
0.116** 
(0.052) 
0.119*** 
(0.047) 
0.120** 
(0.049) 
0.122** 
(0.054) 
0.124** 
(0.062) 
0.127*** 
(0.084) 
𝐻𝐻𝑂𝑂𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 0.759* 
(0.186) 
0.691* 
(0.159) 
0.582* 
(0.127) 
0.511* 
(0.111) 
0.424* 
(0.100) 
0.341* 
(0.103) 
0.290** 
(0.112) 
0.219*** 
(0.129) 
0.083* 
(0.169) 
𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 -0.056 
(0.042) 
-0.048 
(0.036) 
-0.036 
(0.028) 
-0.028 
(0.025) 
-0.018 
(0.022) 
-0.008 
(0.023) 
-0.002 
(0.025) 
-0.005 
(0.029) 
0.020 
(0.039) 
𝑇𝑇𝑂𝑂𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 0.304** 
(0.151) 
0.296** 
(0.131) 
0.283* 
(0.102) 
0.274* 
(0.088) 
0.262* 
(0.079) 
0.252* 
(0.081) 
0.245* 
(0.090) 
0.237** 
(0.103) 
0.220*** 
(0.140) 
𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 -0.004* 
(0.001) 
-0.004* 
(0.001) 
-0.004* 
(0.001) 
-0.004* 
(0.001) 
-0.004* 
(0.001) 
-0.004* 
(0.001) 
-0.004* 
(0.001) 
-0.004* 
(0.001) 
-0.004* 
(0.001) 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 -0.003 
(0.008) 
-0.003 
(0.007) 
-0.003 
(0.005) 
-0.004 
(0.005) 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
-0.002 
(0.004) 
-0.002 
(0.004) 
-0.003 
(0.005) 
-0.003 
(0.007) 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 0.025 
(0.028) 
0.030 
(0.242) 
0.037* 
(0.018) 
0.042* 
(0.016) 
0.047* 
(0.014) 
0.053* 
(0.015) 
0.057* 
(0.016) 
0.061* 
(0.019) 
0.071* 
(0.025) 
𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 -0.305 
(0.441) 
-0.267 
(0.381) 
-0.207 
(0.297) 
-0.167 
(0.256) 
-0.119 
(0.230) 
-0.073 
(0.228) 
-0.039 
(0.263) 
-0.005 
(0.301) 
-0.070 
(0.409) 
 
Table 4 (Continue). Wildfire crime and vulnerability factors using fixed effect quantile estimation. 
Risk Factors Quantiles 
          
 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 0.012 
(0.147) 
0.029 
(0.131) 
0.063 
(0.106) 
0.086 
(0.093) 
0.110*** 
(0.051) 
0.136*** 
(0.091) 
0.170*** 
(0.081) 
0.203** 
(0.101) 
0.229 
(0.158) 
𝑂𝑂𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 0.062 
(0.086) 
0.069 
(0.078) 
0.082 
(0.062) 
0.091** 
(0.055) 
0.100** 
(0.051) 
0.110** 
(0.053) 
0.123** 
(0.054) 
0.135*** 
(0.079) 
0.146 
(0.093) 
𝐻𝐻𝑂𝑂𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 0.699* 
(0.171) 
0.662* 
(0.150) 
0.587* 
(0.123) 
0.534* 
(0.111) 
0.481* 
(0.103) 
0.423* 
(0.107) 
0.290* 
(0.112) 
0.275*** 
(0.155) 
0.216 
(0.182) 
𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 0.012 
(0.037) 
0.010 
(0.033) 
0.007 
(0.023) 
0.004 
(0.023) 
0.019 
(0.022) 
-0.008 
(0.023) 
-0.002 
(0.025) 
-0.008 
(0.034) 
-0.010 
(0.040) 
𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 0.187* 
(0.055) 
0.178* 
(0.049) 
0.160* 
(0.039) 
0.148* 
(0.035) 
0.136* 
(0.033) 
0.122* 
(0.034) 
0.245* 
(0.090) 
0.087*** 
(0.050) 
0.074 
(0.059) 
𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 -0.004* 
(0.001) 
-0.004* 
(0.001) 
-0.005* 
(0.001) 
-0.004* 
(0.000) 
-0.005* 
(0.000) 
-0.004* 
(0.000) 
-0.004* 
(0.000) 
-0.005* 
(0.001) 
-0.005* 
(0.001) 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 -0.001 
(0.007) 
-0.003 
(0.005) 
-0.002 
(0.004) 
-0.001 
(0.004) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
-0.002 
(0.004) 
-0.002 
(0.004) 
-0.001 
(0.006) 
-0.002 
(0.007) 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 -0.006 
(0.026) 
0.001 
(0.023) 
0.011* 
(0.019) 
0.019* 
(0.017) 
0.028* 
(0.016) 
0.036** 
(0.016) 
0.057** 
(0.016) 
0.059** 
(0.024) 
0.068** 
(0.028) 
𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 -0.602** 
 (0.359) 
-0.586*** 
 (0.322) 
-0.555** 
 (0.258) 
-0.533** 
 (0.227) 
-0.511** 
 (0.213) 
-0.487** 
 (0.221) 
-0.039*** 
 (0.263) 
-0.426 
 (0.326) 
-0.402 
 (0.386) 
Note: The table reports the estimated parameters and the robust standard errors (in brackets) of the quantile regression with dependent 
variable 𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖. * Significant at 1%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 10%. 
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5. Business Cycles and Wildfire Crime 
 
In his influential paper Becker (1968) specified a crime production function where the decision of engaging in crime is 
a negative function of the probability of being caught and a negative function of income-equivalent loss experienced by 
the offender for being caught and convicted. According to Becker’s model anything that raises the crime production cost, 
lowers the expected utility of the crime. In this respect, we expect the opportunity cost of crime to be lower during 
contraction phases of the business cycle. This is because GDP growth contractions are usually accompanied by an increase 
in unemployment, lower income, and greater deprivation. Also, reduced central and local income tax during contraction 
periods may result in budgets cuts for crime prevention policy which in turn reduce the probability of being held 
accountable for the crime committed. Given the reduction of crime production costs, we therefore expect higher correlation 
between income and wildfire crime over contraction periods and lower correlation during expansion periods.        
As other Southern European countries, Italy has undergone a prolonged recession period due to the sovereign debt crisis 
that started in 2009. The dip contraction in economic growth led to an increase in inequality and poverty by hitting the 
bottom of the income distribution more severely. The Southern regions were particularly affected by the economic crisis 
as they experienced a contraction in income transfer coupled with a sharp increase in unemployment rate. In this respect,  
a deterioration of economic fundamentals in a region may play a role in human-induced forest fires. A study by Leone et 
al. (2002) found that forests in the South of Italy were voluntarily set on fire to create firefighting jobs. Similarly, Lovreglio 
et al. (2010) report that in Southern regions fires were ignited by seasonal workers in order to force or maintain 
employment. 
Against this background, a natural question arises. Is wildfire crime related to the business cycle? In other words, do 
prolonged contractions in economic growth or sustained expansion periods have a relevant effect on wildfire crime 
patterns? Answers to these questions are important since knowledge of crime behaviour patterns in relation to the economic 
cycle may inform environmental policy makers on the correct course of action to take in order reduce the devastation 
caused by arsons.  
With this target in mind we calculate a time varying correlation coefficient between wildfire crime and income. The 
hypothesis we are testing is that if it is the case that a contraction in income (and other economic fundamentals such as 
unemployment) reduces the crime production cost, as Becker theoretical model suggests, we should see the correlation 
between income and wildfire crime being higher during contraction periods of the business cycle. Also, if it is the case that 
a lower opportunity cost increases the probability of crime, we should observe greater persistence in the correlation over 
time in regions with lower income (i.e. greater unemployment level).       
To investigate this hypothesis, we first rank each region in the sample according to the degree of wildfire crime rate.  
To do so we consider the quantile distribution function of the wildfire distribution for each region over time. Namely, each 
region i at time t was classified as belonging to the 25th, 50th, 75th or the 100th percentile of the wildfire distribution by 
assigning a code from 1 to 4 to each percentile; the 25th percentile being code 1 and the 100th percentile being code 4. In 
doing so we were able to classify each region, in each year, as belonging to a given group according to the code assigned. 
Finally, the twenty Italian regions were classified in four groups according to the gravity of the wildfire crime occurrence. 
Table 2A in Appendix reports the classification of the regions by code. From Table 2A it appears that, with the noticeable 
exception of the Northern region of Liguria, all the regions in the top quantile are in the South of Italy, where per capita 
income is the lowest. Figure 1 reports the average per capita income over time for each group of regions. From Figure 1 it 
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appears that the ranking of the Italian regions in term of wildfire crime in Table 2A exactly matches the level of per capita 
income.    
Figure 2 shows the time varying coefficients between WFt and INCt by code. In particular, Figure 2a), 2b), 2c) and 
2d) report the time varying correlation coefficients between WFt and INCt for regions in code 1, 2, 3 and 4, respectively. 
For each code, the time varying correlation coefficients between the 𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖 and INCt  have been calculated using a 3 year-
moving window as follows 
 
𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖 = ∑ (𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖 −𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖������)(𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 − 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖������)𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖−8
��∑ (𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖 −𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖������)2𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖−8 � ��∑ (𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖 −𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖������)2𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖−8 �. 
 
From Figures 2 a)-d) it appears that the correlation between 𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖 and 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 changes overtime quite substantially, no 
matter the region code taken into consideration. There is clear evidence that the recession that started in 2009 had an impact 
in wildfire crime rate in Italy.  Indeed, regardless of the code under consideration, the correlation coefficients in Figure 2 
are positive and greater in magnitude in correspondence of income throughs in 2010 and 2014, thus confirming the 
predictions of the theoretical model in Becker (1968). Also, it appears that opportunity cost mechanism has a greater impact 
for regions classified in Code 3-4 which have a lower income. Indeed, for these regions, the correlation coefficient is mostly 
positive. Also, in these regions the calculated coefficients 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖 show greater persistence over time and fail to revert to the 
negative sign over the period under consideration. On the other side, it appears that for regions in Code 1-2 the signs of 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖 
show the feature of a mean reverting process.  
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Figure 1. Per capita income during the sample under consideration by region code. Note: the vertical line relates to income turning points. See Table 2A for 
code classification. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Time-varying correlation coefficients between wildfire and per capita income by region code. Note: Time-varying correlation coefficients 
in the y-axes. See Table 2A for code classification. 
 
Income Code 1 
Income Code 3 
Income Code 2 
Income Code 4 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
15000
16000
17000
18000
19000
20000
21000
22000
Code_1 
2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
Code_2 
2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
Code_3 
2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
Code_4 
2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
23 
 
To summarize the results in this section, a simple analysis of the time varying correlation coefficients reveals that 
economic downturns have a significant impact on the probability on the type of environmental crime rate considered on 
this paper. These results are in line with the literature, where it is found that the business cycle has important effects on the 
crime rate (see for example Grogger, 1998; Machin and Meghir, 2004). 
 
Discussion  
 
Before concluding this section, a question is in order: What do we learn from the application of Poisson and quantile 
fixed effect panel models to the data at hand? First, looking at the results in Table 3, it is clear that wildfire crime data do 
not lend themselves to be easily estimated using models that do not take into account fat tails, such as ordinary least squared 
regressions. This is because least squared methods do not have bounded influence and are not able to accommodate for the 
heterogeneity that is an important characteristic of the data considered in this paper. Heavy tails and outliers can make the 
estimators inconsistent, and even when the estimator itself is consistent, the standard errors require higher moments to exist 
(see Cameron and Trivedi, 2013). Also, when modelling the impact of socio-economic factors on wildfire crime, it is 
crucial to take the unobserved individual heterogeneity and distributional heterogeneity into consideration. In this respect, 
the econometric procedures used in this paper allow us to predict the conditional density function of the wildfire crime 
variable under weak assumptions. 
Second, from the results in Table 4 it appears that quantile regression estimation in the environmental crime context is 
a potentially fruitful area of new research.  This is because the use of quantile regression models allows the investigator to 
move away from the central moment of the crime distribution and consider the tails of the distribution where Italian regions 
with the highest and the least level of crime rates are located. The advantage of quantile regression models is that estimators 
are calculated to each quantile. This is certainly interesting from a policy perspective, since policy makers are more 
interested in knowing what happens at the extremes of a distribution than the center. However, the theoretical literature on 
quantile regression in the context of longitudinal data is still at the developing stage and these types of models are still 
rarely used in empirical applications. The modelling framework suggested in Machado and Santos Silva (2019) looks 
promising since it allows an investigator to control for individual specific heterogeneity via fixed effects and at the same 
time to explore heterogeneous covariate effects within the quantile regression framework. Overall, the model offers a more 
flexible approach to the analysis of panel data than that afforded by the classical Gaussian fixed and random effects 
estimators. Looking forward, it would be interesting to use quantile regression methods in the context of longitudinal count 
data. However, to the best of our knowledge, consistent estimators for quantile fixed effect Poisson-type regression models 
are still not available. The estimation of conditional quantiles with count data is notoriously difficult because of the 
conjunction of a non-differentiable sample objective function with a discrete dependent variable and the usual strategies 
based on Taylor expansions cannot be used to obtain the asymptotic distribution of the conditional quantiles (see Machado 
and Santos Silva, 2005). For this reason, in this paper the linear model suggested in Machado and Santos Silva (2019) was 
adopted for the quantile analysis.  
 
6. Conclusion 
 
In this paper we analyze the contributions of socio vulnerability factors in explaining wildfire crime across Italian 
regions. It is found that socio-economic factors are important determinants of wildfire crime. Higher levels of poverty 
24 
 
increase wildfire crime rate. Also, risk factors such as unemployment, and income inequality affect the probability of crime 
in the same direction. On the other side, a negative relationship between the level of education and wildfire crime has been 
found.  The results on the business cycle and the quantile regression analysis support our conjecture that economic 
downturn have a significant impact on the probability on wildfire crime and that the effect is particularly binding in the 
Southern regions where unemployment and income inequality are greater. We also find evidence of a positive correlation 
between organized crime and wildfire crime. Once again, the grip of organized crime appears to be stronger in Southern 
regions.  
The results of this paper are important since according to the Italian environmental group Legambiente (2010) more 
than half of all Italy's fires are started deliberately. Despite of the fact that anthropogenic factors are responsible for most 
forest fires, socio-economic drivers behind wildfires are still poorly understood. In this respect, due to the heterogeneity of 
the economic performance of Italian regions, data used in this paper constitutes an ideal setting since they allow the 
investigator to get as close to a lab designed case-control-type experiment as it can possibly be done in the context of social 
sciences. 
Our results highlight several research needs. First, the analysis in this paper relates to wildfire crime in Italy. However, 
there are other countries in Europe that are plagued by high wildfire crime and great socio-economic divide, Spain is a case 
in point (see Figure 1A in Appendix). Therefore, new research should explore whether the risk factors that we identify in 
this work also hold for other countries in similar situation. Second, the issue of the impact of business cycles on wildfire 
crime, and environmental crime in general, is virtually unexplored. However, in the light of the results in this paper more 
research is needed on the effect of the state of the economy on environmental crime. In this respect, the paucity of suitable 
data is certainly a problem since a proper analysis on this issue requires longer time span than the period considered in this 
work and currently the availability of these data is rather limited. Third, crime deterrence policies are not considered in this 
paper. However, the nonparametric analysis in this work reveal that more than 50% of fire crime areas were concentrated 
in the four Italian regions where the presence of mafia clans is highest. This result calls for further work on the role on the 
deterrence policy that can be put in place to contrast criminal action in the affected areas.1 Finally, policy and fire 
management measures are being implemented in Italy to minimize the negative economic, social and environmental 
impacts of wildfire crime. However, lack of information on the socio-economic drivers of wildfire crime may result in ill-
informed policy decisions and may lead to the misallocation of financial and organizational resources. In this respect,  a 
better understanding of factors driving human-made ignitions is crucial for future fire prevention policies. 
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Figure 1A. Gross domestic product (GDP) per inhabitant in purchasing power standards in relation to the EU-28 average by European 
region (NUTS 2) in 2017. Source: Eurostat. 
 
  
 
           Table 1A. Condition index for the estimated models in Table 2.  
 M1 M2 M3 M4 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 1.00 1.00 - - 
𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 - - 1.00 1.00 
𝑂𝑂𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 1.56 1.35 1.32 1.51 
𝐻𝐻𝑂𝑂𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 1.92 1.97 1.86 2.08 
𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 2.24 - 2.22 - 
𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 - 2.11 - 2.33 
EMPLit - - 2.31 - 
INCit - - - 2.37 
POVit 2.31 - 2.47 - 
UNEMit - 2.16 - 2.74 
DENit 2.58 2.50 2.93 3.05 
RAINit 2.78 2.75 3.33 3.96 
TEMPit 3.53 3.5 4.32 5.66 
AGRIit 5.27 5.25 5.61 7.44 
 
 
 
Table 2A. Classification of Italian regions by quantile according to the degree wildfire crime rate. 
CODE 1 CODE 2 CODE 3 CODE 4 
Trentino Alto Adige Valle Aosta Umbria Molise 
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Veneto Marche Toscana Basilicata 
Emilia Romagna Friuli Venezia Giulia Puglia Liguria 
Piemonte Abruzzo Sicilia Sardegna 
Lombardia Lazio Campania Calabria 
Note: Codes 1, 2,3 and 4 correspond to the 25th, 50th, 75th  and 100th  percentale of wildfire distribution (WF), respectively. 
